
Authorised machine operation
The machine accepts commands only from a person whose stored permissions cover the task, replacing the shared key kept in a drawer.
Machine safety assumes the person at the controls is trained for the task in hand. PITreader replaces that assumption with an RFID transponder key tied to an individual, so what someone may do is defined by stored permissions rather than by who happens to be holding a shared key.
The gain is administrative as much as technical: permissions become a record that can be changed centrally rather than a key that circulates.
An RFID transponder key identifies the individual operator rather than merely unlocking a function.
What a person may do is defined by stored permissions, which can be issued and withdrawn centrally.
The manufacturer positions Identification and Access Management as covering both safety and security aspects together.
Used standalone or with supported safety control architectures, including as an input to PNOZmulti 2.
The typical trigger is an audit finding, an incident, or a persistent habit of using a shared key to reach a mode that should be restricted.

The machine accepts commands only from a person whose stored permissions cover the task, replacing the shared key kept in a drawer.

Entry for cleaning, clearing a blockage or maintenance, where the guard should release only for staff trained for that task.

Where setup mode reduces protection to allow adjustment, the ability to select it is limited to people permitted to work that way.
publishes PITreader within the Identification and Access Management portfolio. Device-level specifications should be confirmed against the current product documentation before quotation.
| Function | RFID-based authentication for machine access and permissions |
|---|---|
| Portfolio | Part of the Identification and Access Management (I.A.M.) range |
| Credential | RFID transponder key issued to an individual |
| Permission model | Stored permissions determine what the holder may do |
| Capability | PL d and SIL CL 2 are stated within the access management range |
| Use | Standalone, or with supported safety control architectures |
| Gate integration | Integrated into PITgatebox variants to activate the pushbutton unit |
| Mode integration | Used with PITmode for access permission and operating-mode selection |
| Controller input | Access permission PITreader is listed among the devices connectable to PNOZmulti 2 base units |
The reader is rarely bought alone. It is normally specified as part of a gate, mode-selection or controller arrangement.
Used on its own to establish identity and permission at an operator station.
Integrated into PITgatebox variants so gate commands are accepted only after successful authentication.
Combined with PITmode so access permission and functionally safe mode selection work together.
Access permission via PITreader is listed among the devices connectable to PNOZmulti 2 base units.
Most of the work in an access-management project is the permission model, not the hardware count.
Keys are issued per person and carry the permissions that determine what the holder may do at the machine.
The pushbutton unit that accepts the operator command once the permission has been checked.
Where the permission must also govern which operating mode the machine will accept.
Define the permission model before the hardware. The number of readers follows from where identity actually has to be established.
Identity and permission form a layer above the safety function. They decide whether an action is allowed to be requested; the safety controller still decides whether the machine may move.